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particularly one who is facing the death penalty. If the affidavits
presented by Gardner are true, then he was denied the assistance of
counsel who was in complete control of his mental and physical
capacities and who was fully capable of exercising the skills his training
afforded.
37
If the court had been presented with evidence Fraser had never
attended law school or passed the bar, and his performance had been the
same in this case, would the court still hold that Gardner received
effective assistance of counsel? If the answer to that question is no, as
one would assume, the court's ruling would not hinge on Fraser's
courtroom performance, but instead would focus on his lack of education
and formal training upon which he could rely in representing his clients.
37 It is interesting to note that despite the court's conclusion here
that Fraser was not ineffective in Gardner's case, Fraser was suspended
from the practice of law in 1990 for a period of three years on unrelated
matters. However, the Order of Discipline from the Disciplinary Hearing
Commission of the North Carolina State Bar, No. 89 DHC D2, specifi-
cally found that Fraser was an alcoholic and was abusing alcohol and
using illegal drugs in 1988 and 1989, that his "misconduct constituted a
The concern would be that he did not do all that a properly trained lawyer
would have done in the case and, therefore, the adversarial system had
broken down.
If an attorney is unable to rely upon his education and training
because of drug impairment, is the situation really any different? The
result should be the same. If the attorney is not able to call upon the proper
education and training with which to represent a criminal client's
interests, for whatever reason, then the client, and the judicial system,
have been adversely affected and justice demands the opportunity for a
new trial.
Summary and Analysis By:
Susan F. Henderson
pattern of neglect and failure to communicate," and that he had received
a prior Private Reprimand for neglect in 1983. The Complaint filed by
the North Carolina State Bar in that matter also alleged that Fraser was
convicted of driving while impaired in 1985, 1988, and 1989. Fraserwas
disbarred on January 13, 1993, as the result of complaints alleging that
he misappropriated client funds in 1989 and 1990.
JONES v. MURRAY
976 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1992)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Following his conviction on two counts of capital murder, Willie
LeRoy Jones was sentenced to death in January 1984. As Jones had no
prior criminal record, the prosecution in the case argued only one
aggravating factor: Jones' conduct was "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an
aggravated battery to the victim."1
Testimony given at Jones' trial indicated that in May 1983,
Graham and Myra Adkins, an elderly couple living in Charles City
County, were found murdered and incinerated in their home. Graham
Adkins had been shot in the face at close range and had apparently died
from that wound prior to the fire. Myra Adkins, on the other hand, had
received a non-fatal head wound and, after having been bound,
gagged, set on fire, and left in a closet, died of smoke inhalation. Both
Mr. and Mrs. Adkins had been doused with accelerant, as had been
their home. Also found on the premises was a safe with its door
removed and its contents missing.
After Jones' conviction was upheld by the Virginia Supreme
Court,2 the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 3 Jones then
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Virginia state courts,
which was denied, as was his appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court4 and
1 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990).
2 Jones v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 427, 323 S.E.2d 554, 554
(1984).
3 Jones v. Virginia, 472 U.S. 1012 (1985).
4 Jones v. Bair, No. 86-1152 (June 15, 1987).
5 Jones v. Bair, 484 U.S. 959, 108 S. Ct. 358 (1987).
6 Jones' motion was made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
7 Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d 1106 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1591 (1992). See case summary of Jones, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 5 (1992).
8 Jones v. Murray, 112 S. Ct. 1591 (1992).
9 Jones v. Murray, 112 S. Ct. 2295 (1992).
his petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.5 Subse-
quently, Jones filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, which, after a report from the
magistrate, was denied. Jones then filed a motion to alter or amend the
judgment,6 which also was denied.
Next, Jones filed a notice of appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's
judgment.7 Jones then filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied.
He applied again to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari, which was denied, 8 as was his petition for rehearing. 9
On August 10, 1992, Jones filed a second state habeas petition,
arguing that Virginia's vileness aggravating factor had been applied to
him in an unconstitutionally vague manner. In support of his position,
Jones cited two recent United States Supreme Court cases: Stringer v.
Black10 and Sochor v. Florida.11 On August 24, 1992, the Common-
wealth filed a motion to dismiss, which the circuit court granted three
days later, finding not only that relitigation of Jones' claim was
procedurally barred under state law, but also that Jones had failed to show
how Stringer and Sochor mandated the relief he sought. On September
8, Jones filed an appeal in the Virginia Supreme Court, which scheduled
oral arguments for September 14, the day before Jones' scheduled
execution.
10 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992) (reemphasizing that "the use of a vague
or imprecise aggravating factor in the weighing process invalidates the
sentence and at the very least requires constitutional harmless-error
analysis or re-weighing in the state judicial system"). See case summary
of Stringer, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 11 (1992).
11 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992) (finding that a trial court may weigh an
impermissibly vague statutory aggravating factor if the highest state
court has previously given constitutionally acceptable narrowing con-
structions of the factor, but that where the sentencer has relied upon an
invalid aggravating circumstance, the reviewing state court must either
independently reweigh the valid factors or apply harmless error analy-
sis). See case summary of Sochor, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1,
p. 11 (1992).
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While his second state habeas petition was still pending, Jones filed
on August 20,1992 amotion underFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
in the United States District Court in Norfolk, raising the issue of the
unconstitutionality of the vileness criterion and requesting a stay of
execution. On September 8, the district court denied the Rule 60(b)
motion, as Jones had not exhausted his state remedies given the pendency
of his appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. Further, the court found
Jones' constitutional challenge to be both procedurally barred and
without merit as a matter of law.
Jones appealed the decision of the District Court denying his stay of
execution and his Rule 60(b) motion to the Fourth Circuit. 12 Jones also
sought review of the decision denying habeas relief and relied on Shell
v. Mississippi 13 for theproposition that the Virginia deathpenalty statute
is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him and that the limiting
instructions offered by Virginia are themselves impermissibly vague.
Jones further argued that Stringer and Sochor require that the jury
unanimously determine at sentencing each aggravating factor upon
which it is basing its sentence.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the limiting instructions based
upon Smith v. Commonwealth14 which were given at Jones' request
were sufficiently specific and provided adequate guidance for the jury in
its determination of vileness.15 The court thus ruled againstJones'Shell
argument, finding that the Smith limiting instructions used at trial, unlike
the dictionary definitions in dispute in Shell, met the requirements of
Godfrey and were constitutional.
t 6
Moving to Jones' Stringer and Sochor arguments, the Fourth
Circuit dismissed the arguments out of hand, finding that the holdings in
Stringer and Sochor applied only to states in which there is a weighing
scheme. 17 Finally, the court found that even if Stringer and Sochor
applied to Virginia, Jones' arguments failed because they were predi-
cated on a finding that Virginia's statute is unconstitutionally vague, a
notion the court had earlier rejected under its Smith analysis. 18
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The Fourth Circuit's rapid dismissal of Jones' Stringer and Sochor
arguments raises questions regarding the use of the two new United
States Supreme Court cases in Virginia. The Fourth Circuit in Jones
dismissed their applicability in part because the court viewed them as not
12 For a discussion of Rule 60(b), see case summary of Gardner
v. Dixon, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
13 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (requiring that limiting instructions used to
cure a facially vague statute must meet the specificity requirements of
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 443 (1980), that for a sentencer to
be adequately guided, there must be a "principled way to distinguish
[a] case[] in which the death penalty was imposed[] from the many
cases in which it [is] not"). See case summary of Shell, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 3 (1991).
14 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135, 139, 149 (1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 967, 99 S. Ct. 2419 91979) (defining aggravated battery as
"a battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable
than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder" and
depravity of mind as "a degree of psychical debasement surpassing
that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and premedita-
tion").
15 Jones v. Murray, 976 F.2d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 1992).16 Id. at 174-75.
17 Jones, 976 F.2d at 175.
18 See Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d 1106 (4th Cir. 1991). See case
summary of Jones, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 5 (1992).
applying to a non-weighing jurisdiction. If the Fourth Circuit is correct
in its questionable assumption that Virginia is a non-weighing state,19
are Stringer and Sochor crafted so narrowly as to restrict their use to
jurisdictions that formally rely on a weighing process?
While Sochor's specific impact can be seen as primarily aimed at
weighing jurisdictions, Stringer reaffirms the importance of Godfrey
safeguards for all capital punishment schemes. Indeed, there is some
irony in the Jones court's finding that Stringer did not apply to non-
weighing states like Virginia, since part of Stringer's holding was the
rejection of Mississippi's argument that the constitutional strictures
governing non-weighing schemes did not apply to a weighing state. In
rejecting the argument, Justice Kennedy wrote, "[To the extent that the
differences are significant, they suggest that application of the Godfrey
principle to the Mississippi sentencing process follows, afortiori, from
its application to the Georgia system .... That Mississippi is a weighing
State only gives emphasis to the requirement that aggravating factors be
defined with some degree of precision. '20 As this excerpt illustrates, the
Stringer opinion works to bolster and reaffirm Godfrey standards in non-
weighing, as well as in weighing, states.
While Justice Souter's Socher opinion is generally cast in weigh-
ing-state terms,21 the underlying message remains that at some point
within the capital sentencing scheme, any improper use of aggravating
factors mustbe specifically and expressly found harmless by a reviewing
court. Without such findings, the Supreme Court has indicated it will not
engage in an assumption that any error was harmless.
22
Therefore, perhaps the broadest and best understanding of Stringer
and Sochor for Virginia practitioners is that these opinions reemphasize
each state's obligation to ensure that aggravating factors are used
meaningfully to guide the sentencer's discretion. In Virginia, we are led
once again to a comparison of Shell and Smith. In Shell, the United States
Supreme Court held that paraphrased dictionary definitions of "hei-
nous," "atrocious," and "cruel" were insufficient to cure the defect in the
facially vague statute and insufficient to clear the tests set by Godfrey.
23
In Smith, the Virginia Supreme Court defined "aggravated battery" and
"depravity of mind" using terminology that the Fourth Circuit in Jones
found "make[s] clear that something other than those factors that ajuror
might expect to find present in an ordinary murder must be present." The
Fourth Circuit has found the constructions in Smith (relied on by Jones
at his trial and given to Jones' jury at his request) to be sufficiently
specific and meaningful.
Nevertheless, Virginia practitioners will want to continue raising
and preserving claims related to the vagueness of Virginia's vileness
19 The Fourth Circuit did add the caveat that they were not
necessarily basing their ruling on whether Virginia was a non-weighing
state; the caveat may have been added because the Virginia Supreme
Court has neverclearly stated whether Virginia's scheme is a"weighing"
or "non-weighing" one. The sentencer in a weighing state (e.g., Missis-
sippi) must, after finding at least one aggravating factor, weigh that factor
against any mitigating factors. In a non-weighing state (e.g., the Fourth
Circuit in Jones cites Virginia), the sentencer must simply find at least
one aggravating factor in order to give death, and only an informal
consideration of mitigating factors is required.
For an example of where the Supreme Court has overruled another
circuit court's conclusion that a state scheme was non-weighing, see
Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528 (1992), and case summary of
Richmond, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
2 0 Id. at 1136 (emphasis added).
21 "We must determine whether, as petitioner claims, the sentencer
in his case weighed either of two aggravating factors that he claims were
invalid, and if so, whether the State Supreme Court cured the error by
holding it harmless." Sochor, 112 S. Ct. at 2117 (emphasis added).
22 SeeRichmondv. Lewis, 113 S.Ct. 528 (1992). See case summary
of Richmond, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
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aggravating factor. For instance, the Fourth Circuit's inability to
describe Virginia's narrowing approach beyond stating that it requires
"something other than those factors ... present in an ordinary murder"
can be seen as continuing to defy the Godfrey prescriptions against
arbitrariness. If opinions such as Godfrey, Stringer and Shell mean
anything, they mean courts must ensure that aggravating factors give
specific guidance or explanations. Also, while it is true that the Virginia
Supreme Court has defined two of the three factors for vileness-
aggravated battery and depravity of mind (torture has not been de-
fined)-the United States Supreme Court has yet to consider the Smith
constructions approved by the Fourth Circuit in Jones.
24
The Fourth Circuit's decision also addressed the question of whether
an appellate court may find an aggravating factor that was not unani-
mously found by the jury. For example, in Jones it is impossible to know
if thejury ever unanimously found "depravity of mind" vileness, "aggra-
vated battery" vileness, or split on which type of vileness applied. The
Fourth Circuit found it did not matter since the Supreme Court has held
that a jury is not essential to capital sentencing. 25 The crucial issue,
however, is whether where a jury is used by the state's sentencing
scheme, may an appellate court find an aggravating factor which the jury
did not unanimously find (or, as in Jones, use a factor for which it is
impossible to tell). Thus, while the Supreme Court has held appellate
courts may throw out invalid aggravating factors and reweigh the
remainder, it is not so clear, as the Fourth Circuit assumed, that a state
appellate court can find aggravating factors in the first instance. The
23 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
24 Id. See also Shell, 111 S. Ct. 313 (1990), where the modified
dictionary definitions were found insufficient to pass constitutional
muster. See case summary of Shell, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No.
2, p. 3 (1991).
2 5 Jones, 976 F.2d at 175 (citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S.
738 (1990) (rejecting the argument that ajury need impose the sentence
of death or make findings to that end) and Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639 (1990) (rejecting the necessity of a jury deciding aggravating and
mitigating factors)0.
26 See Powley, Perfecting the Record of a Capital Case in Virginia,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 26 (1990), and see also case
summaries of Shell, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 3 (1991),
issue appears ripe, therefore, for further litigation.
On a more practical note, a useful tool for preserving challenges
to the Virginia vileness factor is a pre-trial motion for a bill of
particulars, in which counsel can request that the court direct the
Commonwealth to specify the factors upon which it intends to rely in
seeking the death penalty. If the vileness factor arises, counsel should
request that the Commonwealth identify every narrowing construction
upon which it will rely. Should the Commonwealth fail to provide
such constructions, counsel can preserve the Godfrey "unconstitution-
ally vague" issue by filing a brief to that point. Should the Common-
wealth respond with Smith, counsel may want to challenge Smith,
using Shell to argue that the narrowing constructions are themselves
unconstitutionally vague.
26
In summary, the United States Supreme Court has continued to
emphasize the importance of giving meaningful guidance to juries,
guidance that by necessity must come from narrowing constructions of
statutes as vague as Virginia's. 27  While approval of the Smith
narrowing constructions in cases such as Jones might be seen as
discouraging Virginia practitioners from pursuing challenges to speci-
ficity, Stringer and Sochor emphasize the continued importance of




Jones, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 5 (1992), Stringer,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 11 (1992) and Sochor, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 1 (1992).
2 7 See case summaries of Stringer, Sochor andEspinosa v. Florida,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 11 (1992); case summary of
Bunch v. Thompson, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 3 (1992);
Lago, Litigating the "Vileness" Factor in Virginia, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 25 (1991); FalknerThe ConstitutionalDeficien-
cies of Virginia's "Vileness" Aggravating Factor, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 19 (1989); Priddy, Comment, Godfrey v.
Georgia: Possible Effects on Virginia's Death Penalty Law, 15 U. Rich.
L. Rev. 951 (1981).
WISE v. WILLIAMS
982 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1992)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On November 8, 1984, Joe Louis Wise was convicted of capital
murder, grand larceny, armed robbery and use of a firearm in the
commission of a felony. At the ensuing penalty hearing the jury found
Wise's conduct "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved aggravated battery to the victim, beyond the minimum
necessary to accomplish the act of murder" and sentenced Wise to
death.1
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Wise's conviction and sen-
tence on November 27, 1985,2 and on April 7, 1986, the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 3 After a hearing, the state circuit court
dismissed Wise's state habeas petition on December 11, 1989. Wise
1 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2; § 19.2-264.4(C).
2 Wise v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 322, 337 S.E.2d 715 (1985).
did not file a notice of appeal until more than two months after the
expiration of the thirty-day time limit. Wise then made a change in his
court-appointed counsel and was granted leave to file an appeal. After
the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner's motion, he filed
a petition for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 United States Code
Section 2254. The district court granted the Commonwealth of
Virginia's motion to dismiss Wise's petition, holding that Wise's
claims were procedurally barred from consideration because the
Virginia court had based its decision on the "adequate and indepen-
dent" state ground that he did not file his notice of appeal within the
set time limit.
To the Fourth Circuit, Wise challenged this conclusion on four
grounds: that the procedural bar was not adequate because the Virginia
3 Wise v. Virginia, 475 U.S. 1112 (1986).
4 Wise v. Williams, 982 F.2d 142, 146 (4th Cir. 1992).
